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THE WANNSEE LAWYERS 
Legal Positivism Derailed? 
 
Alex Jettinghoff* 
 
Abstract 
It appears that a considerable number of the participants in the ‘Wannsee conference’ were 
lawyers. One wonders why so many lawyers were present at such a meeting and how the 
contemplation of the practicalities of the ‘final solution of the Jewish question’ related to their 
traditional legal education. The paper explains why the high concentration of lawyers at a 
meeting of this level of administration was quite normal at the time and why the suggestion of 
Radbruch, that Nazi lawyers had become victims of the legal positivist bend of their legal 
education, cannot be upheld. Instead, it is suggested that all participants at the conference 
had embraced Nazi ideology, including a collectivist (discarding the individual for the ‘Volk’) 
and racist (discarding equality between Germans and non-Germans) legal terminology. 
However, as such these conceptions were not sufficient for the emergence of the plans dis-
cussed at the Wannsee conference.  
 
Keywords 
Nazi lawyers, Holocaust, legal education, legal theory 
 
1. Introduction 
The HBO docu-drama Conspiracy (Frank Pierson, 2001) offers an oppressive 
reconstruction of the infamous ‘Wannsee conference’, a meeting in a beautiful 
villa near Berlin (Am Groβen Wannsee nr. 56-58) where on 20 January 1942 
fifteen high-ranking Nazi officials discussed the destruction of the entire Euro-
pean Jewry. A striking scene shows one of the participants (making a deroga-
tive remark on the relevance of law), asking he lawyers around the table to 
raise their hands. The number of hands raised suggests that the lawyers were in 
the majority. The scene begs some questions. Were there really that many law-
yers at this meeting? And if so, how can this be explained? And how could they 
square their participation with their legal education? First, however, we will try 
to establish some elementary facts about the meeting.  
                                         
*  Alex Jettinghoff is fellow of the Institute for Sociology of Law, Law Faculty, Radboud 
University Nijmegen [a.jettinghoff@jur.ru.nl].  
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2. Some ‘facts’ about the Wannsee conference 
Mystification 
The problem with establishing facts about the meeting is they have been both 
obscured (by the Nazis) and mythologized (after the war). For instance, there is 
the apparently simple initial fact that Heydrich (Chief of the Reich Security 
Main Office, the RSHA, the central police organization of the regime) invited 
the participants to attend the meeting in order to give effect to a written as-
signment from Göring to take charge of the final solution of the ‘Jewish ques-
tion’ (as is apparent from two salvaged copies of the invitation). After careful 
study, experts on the period have suggested that it might also have been that 
the RSHA initiated the assignment, formulated it and got Göring to sign it. 1 
The meeting had originally been scheduled for 9 December 1941. How-
ever, the meeting was cancelled on 8 December. Why this happened remains 
unresolved. According to some historians it was because of the attack on Pearl 
Harbour, while others suggest the battle for Moscow as the reason. Eventually 
the ‘conference’ was postponed until January 1942.  
What transpired during the meeting has also become a matter of much 
speculation. During the Nuremberg Trials, Allied investigators unearthed the 
single remaining copy of a secret Protokoll, initially taken for the minutes of the 
meeting. A pdf-file of the yellowing document can be downloaded from the 
Internet, complete with the red stamp ‘Geheime Reichssache!’ [State secret].2 In 
all probability, however, the document does not contain minutes in the normal 
sense. If we may believe a later statement by Eichmann (the secretary of the 
meeting), it was a carefully sanitized and polished document, which mainly 
served (if need be) to remind hard-headed officials of who was really in 
charge of the operation and what the project was about.3  
                                         
1  M. Roseman (2003) The Wannsee Conference and the Final Solution; a Reconsideration, 
New York: Metropolitan Books, p. 53. 
2  The Protokoll pdf-file can be downloaded from www.ghwk.de/deut/proto.htm. The site 
also provides short biographies of the participants.  
3  Eichmann’s interrogation on the ‘Wannsee-Konferenz’, 24.7.1961: ‘Yes, it went like this. 
The steno typist was seated beside me and I had to ensure that everything was re-
corded. Afterwards, the steno typist worked out the notes and then Heydrich decided 
what was to be put into the protocol and what not. After that he polished it to a certain 
extent and with that the job was done... Heydrich wanted the essentials firmly estab-
lished in the protocol, because he wanted to nail the State secretaries and hold them hos-
tage to the protocol.’ (author’s translation) 
 Found on www.h-ref.de/vernichtung/wannsee/wannsee-konferenz.php. See also Rose-
man 2003, p. 97 ff. 
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It was (according to the invitation) a meeting ‘followed by breakfast’ start-
ing at noon, so more a kind of brunch.4 According to Eichmann, the first part of 
the meeting was mainly a speech by Heydrich. After a break for food and 
drinks, the meeting turned into a free-for-all discussion. The meeting lasted ap-
proximately 90 minutes. Afterwards, Heydrich appeared very satisfied with 
the results of the meeting and sat down for a few cognacs together with Ge-
stapo chief Müller and Eichmann. He even smoked,5 if Eichmann is to be be-
lieved.  
After the war, it has often been taken for a fact that at this meeting the 
decision for the ‘Final Solution’ was taken, but that is probably a myth.6 Ac-
cording to some historians, the decision must have been made earlier, because 
it had to come from the highest authority, from Hitler himself. The question 
whether there was such a decision by Hitler and – if so – on what date he 
made it has been a topic of some academic debate.7 The historian Christian 
Gerlach concluded that 12 December 1941 must have been the fateful date, 
the day after the declaration of war to the United States.8 However, more re-
cently the consensus among historians seems to be that the ‘Final Solution’ was 
not the result of a single decision by Hitler but the result of a ‘lengthy process 
of radicalization in search for “a solution of the Jewish Question” between 
spring 1941 and summer 1942’.9 The Wannsee conference was one of the 
steps in this process. 
Agenda: who’s in charge 
If not this, then what was the agenda for the meeting? What could Heydrich 
have been so satisfied about? According to historian Mark Roseman, this must 
have been first and foremost the question of who was to be the boss of the 
Final Solution operation.10 Every Ministry had people working on the ‘Jewish 
question’, because it was high on Hitler’s agenda and thus a sure way to win his 
favour. The consequence was that the issue was a bone of contention among 
the competing Ministries, making it – in the absence of any coordination – the 
                                         
4  Original invitation to Luther from pdf-file (source in footnote 3): ‘… Besprechung mit 
anschlieβendem Frühstück zum 20. Januar um 12.00 Uhr …’ [Meeting with subsequent 
breakfast on January 20 at noon].  
5  Roseman 2003, p. 145. 
6  Ibid., p. 2 ff. 
7  Ibid., p. 48 ff. 
8  C. Gerlach (1998) ‘The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of the German Jews, and Hitler’s 
Decision in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews’, The Journal of Modern History 70, 
p. 784-785. 
9  I. Kershaw (2008) Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, p. 268. 
10  Roseman 2003, p. 141 ff. 
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focus of an administrative mess. Heydrich presented his assignment from 
Göring as the ground for the claim that the RSHA was to be the principal coor-
dinating authority for all activities concerning this issue. The other administrative 
agencies had to acknowledge this authority. According to Gerlach, this matter 
had been sounded out beforehand with the top officials of the Ministries in-
volved.11 This might explain why Heydrich stated the authority of his depart-
ment (as far as the protocol shows) as a matter of fact.  
Agenda: evacuation 
Among the announcements during the first part of the meeting was another 
fateful decision phrased in ominous LTI, i.e. that the policy approach to the Fi-
nal Solution had shifted from emigration to ‘evacuation’.12 Before the outbreak 
of the war in the European theatre, approximately 500,000 Germans had 
been forced into emigration.13 Even the comprehensive emigration of the Jew-
ish population to Madagascar had been seriously considered as an option.14 
The outbreak of war ruled this option out and therefore the alternative of 
‘evacuation’ was the chosen method. In the protocol, a morbid page (page 6) 
lists the national origin and total numbers of people estimated to be eligible 
for ‘evacuation’: a total of 11 million people. This number did not only include 
people from the countries that were at that moment under German occupation, 
but also other European countries like Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Turkey and the Soviet Union. It was clearly a long-term project. On the mean-
ing of ‘evacuation’, the protocol is rather explicit. It spells out that Europe was 
to be combed from West to East and all Jewish people would be fetched and 
transported to the East. Those fit for work would be put to work on the con-
struction of the necessary infrastructure in the Eastern occupied territories. It 
was expected that the majority would quickly die of ‘natural causes’.15 The 
ones that survived had to be ‘dealt with appropriately’, because they might 
become the seedbed of future resistance. The fate of those ‘unfit for work’ is 
not mentioned, but not hard to guess. Logistically, this was a rather vague plan, 
but the chief intention is clear – the total physical annihilation of all European 
                                         
11  Gerlach 1998, p. 773. 
12  ‘LTI’ stands for Lingua Tertii Imperii, a term coined by the linguist Victor Klemperer in a 
contemporary study of Nazi-speak: (1975) LTI, Notizbuch eines Philologen, Leipzig: Re-
clam. 
13  G. Deschner (1977) Reinhard Heydrich, Statthalter der totalen Macht, Esslingen am 
Neckar: Bechtle, p. 194. 
14  Roseman 2003, p. 31. The plan hinged on the use of the British merchant marine for 
transportation. Obviously, this participation was ruled out by the war.  
15  A statistic in the protocol indicating that a large part of the target group had no experi-
ence of manual labour, underpinned the plausibility of the effectiveness of these ‘natural 
causes’.  
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Jews. The protocol does not mention any reaction to this principle, let alone any 
objection.  
Agenda: range of victims 
The topic that was however intensively discussed during the meeting was the 
question of who was to be included in the ‘evacuation’. The discussion was fo-
cussed on borderline cases, i.e. people who were partly Jewish (Mischlinge) 
and mixed marriages (Mischehen). These were categories that the Nazi regime 
was used to handle with care. It was feared that a radical approach towards 
these groups would undermine public support for the measures against the 
Jews. We encounter here a social mechanism that the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman has pointed out and analysed, that in Germany the measures against 
the Jews were generally supported by the public, but at the same time the 
public demanded that exceptions were made in particular cases – when it con-
cerned a neighbour, friend, colleague, war veteran etc.16 Hitler is known to 
have feared (and privately loathed) these reactions. Therefore, until the meet-
ing, the Mischlinge had evaded persecution, more or less. During the meeting, 
however, Heydrich came up with a drastic proposal – half-Jews were in the 
context of the Final Solution to be treated as Jews (with some exceptions), while 
people who were one-quarter Jewish would not be included in the operation 
(also with some exceptions). These proposals were met in the meeting with 
practical objections from the participants. The ensuing discussion did not end in 
any definite conclusions. It is noteworthy also that the most prominent lawyer of 
the group, Wilhelm Stuckart (State Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior and 
co-author of the Nuremberg race laws), did not use any legal argument in the 
discussion. He allegedly only objected that the administrative implementation 
of the proposals would be very difficult. He suggested forced sterilization for 
these categories and to declare all mixed marriages dissolved by force of 
law.17  
The meeting appears to have been a satisfactory result for an ambitious 
man like Heydrich: he had officially become the chief coordinator of an un-
heard-of, gigantic and ideologically ‘necessary’ operation and his radical pro-
posals concerning the border-line cases had only been met with practical ob-
jections. Also later, no definite decisions were made concerning these groups, 
                                         
16  Z. Bauman (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust, Oxford: Polity Press, p. 184 ff. 
17  Roseman 2003, p. 142 ff. After the war he stated that he had proposed sterilization to 
sidetrack the decision making: he knew that sterilization at the time was a measure that 
could not be executed. 
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because Hitler feared the reaction on the ‘home front’. This thwarted any fur-
ther ‘initiatives’ in the matter.18 
3. Elite of the State 
The lawyers 
The question about the number of lawyers present at the meeting can be easily 
resolved by some browsing on the Internet.19 Indeed, not all, but still the major-
ity, were lawyers, i.e. people with academic legal training. Of the fifteen men 
participating in the meeting (thus excluding the note-taker), six were lawyers 
with a doctorate (Dr.jur.): Freisler of the Ministry of Justice, Stuckart of the Min-
istry of the Interior, Bühler of the Generalgouvernement (Ministry for Occupied 
Eastern Poland), Klopfer of the Party Chancellery, Lange and Schöngarth of 
the RSHA. Kritzinger of the Reich Chancellery and Neumann of the Four-Year 
Plan had studied law without gaining a doctorate. Meyer of the Occupied 
Eastern Territories (mainly the Baltic States) studied law and economics and 
had a PhD in political science. One can say that the level of legal expertise ran 
high in this group.  
 This begs the second question: why were there so many lawyers present? 
The answer can be inferred from the qualifications of those sitting at the table 
in Wannsee. This kind of meeting was a congregation of Staatssekretäre (Minis-
ter’s deputies), the highest remaining body of government since Hitler dis-
carded cabinet meetings in 1937.20 To be sure, not all present were Staatssek-
retäre (some participants of the RSHA clearly were not), but most could speak 
for their Ministry. They belonged to the top-bureaucrats of the Reich.  
 As the sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf pointed out long ago, during the first 
half of the twentieth century almost three-quarters of the highest positions in the 
civil service of the German national state were occupied by lawyers.21 He 
called this condition of the German State bureaucracy: a monopoly of lawyers 
(Juristenmonopol). This means that the density of lawyers in this group was nor-
mal or maybe even modest. 
                                         
18  Gerlach 1998, p. 802; Roseman 2003, p. 147; H.G. Adler (1974) Der Verwaltete 
Mensch [Administrated Man], Tübingen: Mohr, p. 202 ff. 
19  See short biographies on: http:de.wikipedia.org/wiki/; also on website mentioned in 
footnote 2. 
20  A.J. Kay (2006) ‘Germany’s Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May 
1941’, Journal of Contemporary History 41 (4), p. 688. 
21  R. Dahrendorf (1965) Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland [Society and Democra-
cy in Germany], München: Piper, p. 260 ff. 
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The SS: a band of lawyers? 
It is easy to overlook the presence of lawyers at Wannsee because of the 
prominent presence of the SS in the meeting, an organization one tends to as-
sociate with thugs and not with academics.22 However, evidently these qualities 
are not mutually exclusive. The officer echelons of the SS were riddled with 
highly educated people and a large part of these were lawyers. 
Gunnar Boehnert has researched the number of academics joining the SS 
during the years 1925-1939 and concluded that 30% of the SS officers had 
completed a university education and a good one-third of those were law-
yers.23 His data also show that most lawyers joined directly after the Nazis 
seized power in 1933, a general pattern called the ‘Academiker rush’. Of the 
full-time SS officers, many were recent graduates from law school and typi-
cally worked in the security apparatus, the RSHA.24 Lawyers were apparently 
willing to join the club to make a career and the SS had a longstanding policy 
to attract academics into the officer ranks. When setting up his RSHA, Heydrich 
had taken the British Secret Service, with its well-educated staff, as his chief 
model.25 Also the head of the legal department of the RSHA, Werner Best (we 
will hear more of him shortly), was a strong supporter of lawyers joining the 
ranks of SS officers.26  
Of the six full-time SS officers present at the Wannsee meeting, only 
Schöngarth and Lange had a law degree and worked in ‘security’, as leaders 
of police death squads (Einsatzgruppen) operating in the Eastern Territories. But 
they were not the only SS members with a law degree. Another practice that 
the SS leadership developed was to incorporate a selection of aristocrats and 
high-ranking civil servants into the Allgemeine SS, as part-time SS members. 
                                         
22  Six participants of the Wannsee meeting belonged to the regular SS. Chairman Heydrich 
(Chief of the RSHA/General) and Secretary Eichmann (RSHA, Dept. IVB-Jewish Matters/ 
Lieutenant-Colonel) were in full-time SS service and they were accompanied at the meet-
ing by fellow RSHA staff: Müller (Head of Dept. IV-Gestapo/Lieutenant-General), and 
two ‘experts’ from the Einsatzgruppen Schöngarth (Security Police-SD/Brigadier-General) 
and Lange (Security Police-SD/Major). Hofmann was, like Heydrich, serving directly un-
der Himmler (as Chief of the Race and Relocation Dept./Lieutenant-General). 
23  G.C. Boehnert (1981) ‘The Jurists in the SS-Führerkorps 1925-1939’, in: G. Hirschfeld & 
L. Kettenacker (eds), Der ‘Führerstaat’: Mythos und Realität [The Fuhrer State: myth and 
reality], Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, p. 362. 
24  This is the ‘civil’ branch of the SS (Allgemeine SS) as opposed to the military branch 
(Waffen SS). 
25  Deschner 1977, p. 58 ff. 
26  Disagreement about this very point with Heydrich became his undoing in the RSHA. He 
left, eventually to become Plenipotentiary (Reichsbevollmächtigte) of Denmark, cf. U. 
Herbert (1996) Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Ver-
nunft 1903-1989 [Best. Biographic studies on radicalism, worldview and reason], Bonn: 
Dietz, p. 228 ff. 
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They kept their normal jobs, while their membership had a largely representa-
tive function (the privilege to wear the uniform at official occasions). Apart from 
this, they performed some weekend exercises and may have functioned as liai-
son and/or spies for the SS.27 Also some of the Wannsee lawyers were con-
nected to the SS in this way: Klopfer (joined in 1935), Neumann (in 1934), and 
Stuckart (in 1936).28 Thus, of the nine SS-members present, five were lawyers. 
4. The influence of legal education 
Legal positivism? 
The start of the Holocaust was not decided at the Wannsee meeting, but it was 
crucial in its execution. All braches of government were bound to support its 
implementation under the leadership of the RSHA. All the participants in the 
meeting knew what the objectives of the ‘Final Solution’ were and supported 
them. One wonders how the lawyers among them could square this unprece-
dented mass murder with their legal training? This is of course a somewhat 
loaded question. It implies that something might have been instilled in law stu-
dents during their studies that would be a barrier to participation in the plan-
ning of mass murder. Natural law elements could provide that barrier, like uni-
versal human rights. But we have to realize that the modern human rights 
movement was a reaction to the Holocaust. During a large part of the twentieth 
century, universalism had to pay second fiddle to nationalism. It largely contin-
ued the nineteenth-century cult of the nation state and of the law posited by 
that state.  
Interestingly, after the war, it was the doctrine of legal positivism that was 
blamed for the behaviour of the German lawyers in the Third Reich. The fa-
mous criminal law professor Gustav Radbruch (robbed of his chair by the Nazis 
because of his leftist sympathies) suggested that this conception of law made 
the lawyers defenceless against legal injustice.29 That is how the Nuremberg 
racial legislation could pass as law, while these laws were clearly in conflict 
with substantive principles of justice, in particular with the principle of equality. 
He proposed to remedy this by reintroducing substantive criteria for valid law. 
 Is it likely that the Wannsee lawyers had become indoctrinated with le-
gal positivism during their studies? Most of them studied during the 1920s (only 
Kritzinger and Neumann studied law before the First World War). Was legal 
                                         
27  Boehnert 1981, p. 364. 
28  They were appointed to high ranks: Klopfer and Neumann were Brigadier-General at 
the time of the Wannsee meeting. Stuckart must have had a similar rank at the time. See: 
de.wikipedia.org/wiki/. 
29  G. Radbruch (1946) ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergestzliches Recht’ [Legal injustice and 
meta-legal justice], Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 2, p. 131-135. 
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positivism the general standard in the law schools of that period? The magnum 
opus of the legal historian Michael Stolleis on the history of German public law 
sketches a different legal-theoretical landscape of the period.30 In these turbu-
lent years, apolitical and ahistorical legal positivism (the dominant position dur-
ing the Imperial period) had gradually become a minority position, opposed on 
the one hand by the ‘pure legal science’ of the Vienna School around Hans Kel-
sen, and on the other hand by a politicizing and historizing ‘anti-positivist’ 
movement.  
In this context Radbruch’s hypothesis does not appear very convincing. A 
number of the Wannsee lawyers were early NSDAP members: Schöngarth 
(1922), Stuckart (1923), Freisler (1925) and Meyer (1928). The rest had 
joined the party in 1933, when the Nazis came to power.31 That looks like op-
portunism, but they also give the impression of having been ardent Nazis be-
fore joining the party. This means that if they had any interest in legal theory 
during their studies, they would have felt drawn towards legal theory that took 
a critical stance towards the political scapegoat of the era, the Weimar Re-
public. According to Stolleis, during the 1920s a deep distaste for the Republic 
was widely shared among lawyers, but it was expressed most strongly by the 
‘anti-positivist’ movement. This was a mixed batch of theorists, with a strong 
presence of nationalists. They rejected the parliamentary democracy of the 
Republic, with its party politics that weakened the state; they scorned the lib-
eral Rechtsstaat with its emphasis on individual rights; and hated the peace 
treaty of Versailles – its injustice revealed the truth about international law: 
that it equals power. The nationalists propagated order, unity and a strong 
state. Also the NSDAP counted legal theorists among its party members, some 
of whom were hammering out legal theory that could be linked to the Party 
programme. One of them was Werner Best, later to become Heydrich’s deputy 
at the RSHA. 
An early example: the nationalist legal theory of Werner Best 
Werner Best (born 1903) was until 1940 the director of Amt 1 – Verwaltung 
und Recht (Administration and Law) of the RSHA and well respected in aca-
demic circles as a legal theorist. In 1930 (the year he joined the NSDAP), Best 
published a paper titled ‘Der Krieg und das Recht’ (‘War and Law’).32 In this 
publication (typically under the editorship of Ernst Jünger) he presented an 
                                         
30  M. Stolleis (1999) Geschichte des öffentliches Rechts in Deutschland [History of administra-
tive law in Germany], Vol. 3, 1914-1945, München: Beck, p. 153 ff.  
31  Except Kritzinger who only joined the party in 1938.  
32  In: E. Jünger (ed.), Krieg und Krieger [War and warrior], Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 
p. 137-161. 
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analysis of contemporary international law. In his view, the peace treaties and 
other international agreements of and after 1918 (like those founding the 
League of Nations) were based on false presuppositions. These came in two 
versions.  
The first one he called the ‘utopian-rationalist’ theory. This theory stated 
that war is essentially in conflict with human nature. Therefore war can and has 
to be suppressed to create a legal condition that is in accord with human na-
ture. Multilateral treaties that prevent war, because they enable the imposition 
of sanctions on states that violate the peace treaties, can do this. The second 
theory he called the ‘moral-idealistic’ position. It does not take its cue from hu-
man nature, but from the idea that peace should be preserved as a valuable 
condition, although that may be hard to realise. Individual states must try to 
preserve peace. International treaties can be instruments serving this purpose, 
but war stands outside this legal order (aggressive states are not subject to 
international sanctions).  
His own (third) position was called the ‘heroic-realist’ approach. The other 
two approaches reject the idea that war is a natural and unchangeable fact of 
life. The ‘new nationalism’ however accepts this reality and also does not try to 
change it. Struggle and war have to be considered and accepted as parts of 
life itself. There is no law that stands above struggle: it is implicated in it. Essen-
tially law is a marker of the relationship between conflicting parties and the 
starting point for the next struggle. That is at least the situation in international 
law. International legal order only reflects the power relations between nations 
at the conclusion of the last war. International treaties are to be considered as 
weapons and methods of struggle between rivals. According to Best, this line of 
reasoning is also valid for national law. In his conception, in legal order there is 
no place for absolute legal elements like universal human rights. Struggle and 
its outcome are the foundation of morality. Law is power.  
The road to Wannsee 
We can conclude that it was not positivism that had a firm hold over the law 
students of the generations of the 1920s. ‘Anti-positivist’ positions were much 
more in fashion. But these legal theories, even those like Best’s (though ominous 
in its implications) did not imply pleas for genocide. That was beyond the hori-
zon as yet. It would take more than a theory to implicate the Wannsee lawyers 
in the Final Solution. 
A first necessary condition was created when Hitler embarked on his road 
to dictatorship in 1933. He made haste to dismantle the Rechtsstaat, initially 
promising that this would be a temporary measure. But the Führerstaat he sub-
sequently built was to stay for more than a decade, considered as a necessity 
for the war that would be inevitable. In the new political order individual citi-
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zens were transformed into members of the German ‘People’ (Volk), their fun-
damental rights were replaced by duties of membership. The Führerbefehl (se-
cret or otherwise) became the superior legal foundation for all public action. 
Legal niceties (like following the law) that stood in the way of effective dicta-
torship were not tolerated.33 Best had nicely fathomed the attitude of the Nazis 
towards law and lawyers. They were to be the willing instruments of the 
Führer’s will.  
A second necessary condition was the introduction after 1933 of an inno-
cent sounding legal vocabulary, which was essentially racist.34 It developed 
around the concept of Volk. This quasi-scientific Neo-Darwinist notion was 
meant to separate the members of the German Volk from the non-Germans 
(Volksfremde). This last group included those not of German ‘blood’ and those 
opposed to the interests of the German Volk. In practice this created a dual 
state, where part of the nation effectively became outlaws. Jews were gradu-
ally stripped of their political and civil rights and political opponents were put 
in prison and concentration camps. These actions also transformed the character 
of the German legal community. Gradually, Jewish lawyers as well as non-
Jewish lawyers who opposed the regime lost their jobs and disappeared from 
public life. The remaining lawyers either sympathised with or acquiesced in the 
new Nazi regime. The regime could offer opportunities for followers and many 
academics joined the Nazi ranks. The lawyers present at the Wannsee meeting 
had made a stunning career in the new Nazi state and were well versed in (or 
even – like Stuckart – contributed to) its racist legal vocabulary.  
But even these conditions, although necessary conditions for the involvement 
of lawyers in the Holocaust, were not sufficient conditions for its occurrence. As 
we have mentioned, before the outbreak of the war all kinds of methods to 
‘solve the Jewish question’ were contemplated and used. It was the outbreak of 
the war (and especially America’s participation in it) that radicalised the plans 
for the Final Solution. The Wannsee-lawyers were among the people who had 
taken it upon them to fulfil this horrid ‘mission’ in an administrative or practical 
capacity. Clearly, no substantive remains of their legal education stood in the 
way of this choice.35  
                                         
33  I. Müller (1999) Hitler’s Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich, Harvard University Press, 
p. 219 ff. 
34  See for an extensive study of this terminology: D. Maier (2013) ‘Non-Germans’ under the 
Third Reich, Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press. 
35  Stolleis 1999, Ch. 10. Few of the participants of the Wannsee meeting (typically in their 
early forties at the time) lived into old age. Some participants (e.g. Heydrich, Freisler, 
Lange, Meyer) died before the end of the war. Others (e.g. Schöngarth, Bühler) were 
tried and executed after the end of the war. Stuckart, Kritzinger and Neumann died a 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The presence of a considerable number of lawyers at Wannsee was indeed 
accurate and not abnormal for this kind of gremium. At the time of the Wann-
see meeting, their legal education had become utterly irrelevant as a factor in 
guiding these lawyers. They had become pole bearers of the new political or-
der and committed to serve it and its leader. Hitler expected that his officials 
obeyed him without hesitation.36  
 Of law, lawyers and the machinery of justice as such Hitler expected 
only two things. The first was to keep up appearances so that everything went 
on as normal. The shell of the organization of justice and legal practice was 
preserved. During the Holocaust, great care was taken to maintain some form 
of legality. The Nuremberg race laws were drafted with normal craftsmanship. 
Even in the Wannsee protocol it is mentioned (concerning an instruction to Hey-
drich) that: ‘The mission was to clear the German living space in a legal manner 
from Jews’ (my italics). This had nothing to do with respect for the law. Legality 
was considered an instrument to soothe the German public and to make the 
victims defenceless. The second task was to terrorise dissidents and ‘antisocial’ 
elements into submission.37 Both demands originated from one source – Hitler’s 
obsessive fear for the old First World War spectre of a collapsing home front 
during wartime.38 
In this atmosphere, it is unlikely that the lawyers at Wannsee had profes-
sional misgivings about the subject of the meeting. The demands of the Nazi 
leadership on law and lawyers and the willingness of the latter to oblige were 
                                         
few years later. Klopfer outlived them all. He became an attorney-at-law in Ulm and 
died in 1987. 
36  For example, on 14 March 1942, a criminal court in Oldenburg declared Ewald Schlitt 
guilty of assault and battery of his wife, who died from her injuries. The court did not 
sentence him to death, because he was judged to have acted during an uncontrollable 
emotional outburst. When Hitler heard of this sentence, he became extremely enraged, 
demanding a death sentence out of hand. He made it clear to Acting Minister of Justice 
Schlegelberger that such leniency of the judiciary was intolerable and had to be cor-
rected (as it later was). Schlegelberger did his utmost to instruct the judiciary accord-
ingly, but Hitler was not satisfied. A fortnight later he publicly scolded the judiciary dur-
ing a special meeting of the Reichstag. A few months later Schlegelberger was dismissed 
and replaced by a more understanding successor. See: N. Wachsmann (2004) Hitler’s 
Prisons. Legal Terror in Nazi Germany. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 196 ff; 
also E. Nathans (2000) ‘Legal Order as Motive and Mask: Franz Schlegelberger and the 
Nazi Administration of Justice’, Law and History Review 18 (2), p. 297. 
37  Cf. Wachsmann 2004, passim. 
38  The so-called ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth. This story was largely a fabrication of the de-
feated German army leadership. See e.g. S. Haffner (2002) Der Verrat: Deutschland 
1918-1919 [Betrayal: Germany 1918-1919], Berlin: Verlag 1900. 
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rooted in a form of ‘legal nihilism’, the conviction that law is essentially irrele-
vant.39 
 
 
 
                                         
39  The term ‘legal nihilism’ was reanimated in 2008 by President Medvedev in a critical 
reflection on respect for law in Russia. See: www.ft.com. 
